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Entropy-Based Collaborative Detection of DDOS Attacks 
on Community Networks 
Abstract
A community network often operates with the same Internet Service 
Provider domain or the virtual network of different entities who are 
cooperating with each other. In such a federated network 
environment, routers can work closely to raise early warning of 
DDoS attacks to void catastrophic damages. However, the attackers 
simulate the normal network behaviors, e.g. pumping the attack 
packages as Poisson distribution, to disable detection algorithms. It 
is an open question: how to discriminate DDoS attacks from surge 
legitimate accessing. We noticed that the attackers use the same 
mathematical functions to control the speed of attack package 
pumping to the victim. Based on this observation, the different attack 
flows of a DDoS attack share the same regularities, which is different 
from the real surging accessing in a short time period. We apply 
information theory parameter, entropy rate, to discriminate the 
DDoS attack from the surge legitimate accessing.  We proved the 
effectiveness of our method in theory, and the simulations are the 
work in the near future. We also point out the future directions that 
worth to explore in the future. 
1. Introduction 
The Internet is an open architecture susceptible to various 
forms of network attacks, a prime example of which is the 
Distributed Denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. The early 
attacks to the well-known web sites, such as CNN, Amazon, 
Yahoo, in early 2000 brought the normal services of victims 
stopped for hours [9].  A study showed that the number of 
DDoS attacks increased by 50% per year [11], and the attacks 
were also increased in sophistication and severity. There are 
lots of attack methods, such as DDoS, DRDoS [17]. Flooding 
packages are the most common and effective attack tool 
among all the attack methods.  
To against DDoS attacks, researchers have designed and 
implemented a number of countermeasures. In general, the 
counter DDoS attacks fall in three folds: detection, defense (or 
mitigation), and IP trace-back. It is obvious that detecting 
DDoS attacks in real time is the first step of combating DDoS 
attacks. [4] surveyed the methodologies that used in DDoS 
detection, such as, activity profiling [15] [8], sequential 
change-point detection [2] [20] [3] [7] , wavelet analysis [1], 
chi-square/entropy detector [8] [13], and so on. However, 
fighting DDoS is a constant spy versus spy game. The 
defender will try to defend against all the known attacks, and 
the attacker will try to disguise their attacks to stay under the 
radar. Every time, when a new defending method is invited, 
the attacker will design a counter defending method to attack, 
e.g. attackers may simulate the normal network behaviors to 
disable the detection. 
It is a open question and a considerable challenge to 
discriminate DDoS flooding attacks from sudden increase in 
legitimate traffic or flash events [12] [4] [7]. [12] tried to use 
three dimensions, traffic patterns, client characteristics and file 
reference characteristics, to discriminate the flash event from 
DoS attacks. This counter attack method can not follow the 
ever changing attack methods, as the attack patterns are 
changing from time to time, moreover, the attacker will 
simulate the network traffic pattern of flash event, et al, which 
will disable the detector quickly. The entropy detector 
mentioned in the survey [4] came from paper [8], which used 
entropy very shallowly. It can raise the alarm for a sudden 
massive accessing, however, it can not discriminate the DDoS 
from the surge of legitimate accessing. [7] suggested to 
separate flash crowd from DDoS flooding by “other” 
performance metrics (except the change-point detection 
method) to capture their difference, however, there is no clue 
about the possible metrics in the paper at all.  
An effective and critical method against DDoS attacks is to 
identify attacks as early as possible. Most of the current DDoS 
defense schemes are based on detecting sustained congestion 
on communication links [14], running out of half-open SYN 
queue, or imbalance between incoming and outgoing traffic 
volume on routers [4]. These detecting methods, 
unfortunately, have to wait for the flooding becomes 
widespread, consequently, they make the defense scheme 
ineffective to fence off the DDoS timely. An ideal scenario is 
to eliminate the DDoS before the attack packages reach the 
target. 
The community network offers the convenience of network 
administration. A community network often operates with the 
same Internet Service Provider domain or the virtual network 
of different entities who are cooperating with each other. In 
such a federated network environment, routers can work 
closely to raise early warning of DDoS attacks to void 
catastrophic damages. 
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In this paper, we motivated by identifying DDoS attacks at the 
early stage in community networks, and eliminating attack 
packages before they reach the target. The second motivation 
is to counter the attacks which simulate normal network 
accessing patterns to fly under the radar, namely, discriminate 
DDoS attacks from the surge of legitimate traffic. In order to 
achieve these goals, we take use of information theory 
parameter, entropy, which is a measure for the randomness of 
a process, to raise the alarm for the potential attacks. We 
define the packages which share the same destination address 
as a flow, and entropy will be employed to measure the 
randomness of flows on a given router. Once an alarm is 
raised for a flow, we will employ, entropy rate, which is the 
rate of growth of entropy, on the path of the flow to the 
destination. If the flow is a DDoS attack, the entropy rates on 
different routers are the same or very close (in case of the 
normal accessing as ‘noise’).  
Our contributions in this paper are as follows: 
 Raising DDoS attack alarm at the edge routers in 
community networks. We collect flow samples on 
routers of community networks, especially the edge 
routers, for a time window. If the entropy on routers 
changed dramatically, a DDoS attack alarm is raised 
at the router. However, the entropy itself can not 
discriminate DDoS attacks from the surge of 
legitimate traffic.  
 Discriminating DDoS attacks from the surge of 
legitimate traffic effectively. In order to further 
confirm the raised DDoS attack alarm, entropy rates 
for the suspected flow are calculated at the 
neighbored routers. If the entropy rates are the same 
or very similar, then we can confirm the DDoS 
attack.
 Eliminating DDoS attack packages before they reach 
the target. Once the attack is confirmed, the router 
will discard the suspected flow, namely, the attack 
flow. In curtain community networks, the detection 
and elimination could be done before the attack 
packages reach the target. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents the related work of DDoS attacks, and the 
preliminaries of information theory that we will deploy in the 
following analysis. We analyze and model the detection of 
DDoS attacks in Section 3. The detection algorithm is 
designed in Section 4. Finally, we discuss the future work in 
Section 5. 
2. Related Work and Background 
A. Related work of DDoS attacks 
DDoS attacks target on exhausting the victim's resources, such 
as, network bandwidth, computing power, operating system 
data structures, and so on. To launch a DDoS attack, 
malicious users first establish a network of computers that 
they will use to generate the volume of traffic needed to deny 
services to computer users. To create this attack network, 
attackers discover vulnerable sites or hosts on the network. 
Vulnerable hosts are usually those that are either running no 
antivirus software or out-of-date antivirus software, or those 
that have not been properly patched. Vulnerable hosts are then 
exploited by attackers who use their vulnerability to gain 
access to these hosts. The next step for the intruder is to install 
new programs (known as attack tools) on the compromised 
hosts of the attack network. The hosts that are running these 
attack tools are known as zombies, and they can carry out any 
attack under the control of the attacker. Many zombies 
together form what we call an army [17].
Attackers can use different kinds of techniques (referred to as 
scanning techniques) in order to find vulnerable machines 
[19] [21] [22]. Such as random scanning, the machine that is 
infected by the malicious code (such a machine can be either 
the attacker's machine or the machine of a member of their 
army, such as a zombie) probes IP addresses randomly from 
the IP address space and checks their vulnerability. Hit-list
scanning: Long before attackers start scanning, they collect a 
list of a large number of potentially vulnerable machines. In 
their effort to create their army, they begin scanning down the 
list in order to find vulnerable machines. Topological 
scanning: Topological scanning uses information contained 
on the victim machine in order to find new targets. Local
subnet scanning: This type of scanning acts behind a firewall 
in an area that is considered to be infected by the malicious 
scanning program. Permutation scanning: In this type of 
scanning, all machines share a common pseudorandom 
permutation list of IP addresses. 
The attackers have three categories of methods to propagate 
their malicious codes, the attack tools, such as Central source 
propagation: In this mechanism, after the discovery of the 
vulnerable system that will become one of the zombies, 
instructions are given to a central source so that a copy of the 
attack toolkit is transferred from a central location to the 
newly compromised system; Back-chaining propagation: In 
this mechanism, the attack toolkit is transferred to the newly 
compromised system from the attacker; Autonomous 
propagation: In this mechanism, the attacking host transfers 
the attack toolkit to the newly compromised system at the 
exact moment that it breaks into that system. 
There are two categories of DDoS attacks, typical DDoS 
attack and DRDoS attacks. In a typical DDoS attack, the army 
of the attacker consists of master zombies and slave zombies.
The hosts of both categories are compromised machines that 
have arisen during the scanning process and are infected by 
malicious code. The attacker coordinates and orders master 
zombies and they, in turn, coordinate and trigger slave 
zombies. More specifically, the attacker sends an attack 
command to master zombies and activates all attack processes 
on those machines, which are in hibernation, waiting for the 
appropriate command to wake up and start attacking. Then, 
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master zombies, through those processes, send attack 
commands to slave zombies, ordering them to mount a DDoS 
attack against the victim. In that way, the agent machines 
(slave zombies) begin to send a large volume of packets to the 
victim, flooding its system with useless load and exhausting 
its resources.  Unlike typical DDoS attacks, in DRDoS attacks 
the army of the attacker consists of master zombies, slave 
zombies, and reflectors [10]. The scenario of this type of 
attack is the same as that of typical DDoS attacks up to a 
specific stage. The attackers have control over master 
zombies, which, in turn, have control over slave zombies. The 
difference in this type of attack is that slave zombies are led 
by master zombies to send a stream of packets with the 
victim's IP address as the source IP address to other uninfected 
machines (known as reflectors), exhorting these machines to 
connect with the victim. Then the reflectors send the victim a 
greater volume of traffic, as a reply to its exhortation for the 
opening of a new connection, because they believe that the 
victim was the host that asked for it. 
The defense DDoS attacks is a catch-me-if-you-can game. 
From the beginning, all legitimate users have tried to respond 
against these threats. University communities and software 
corporations have proposed several methods against the DDoS 
threat. Despite the efforts, the solution remains a dream. The 
attackers manage to discover other weaknesses of the 
protocols and—what is worse—they exploit the defense 
mechanisms in order to develop attacks. They discover 
methods to overcome these mechanisms or they exploit them 
to generate false alarms and to cause catastrophic 
consequences. The basic discrimination is between preventive
[5][ 16]and reactive [18] defense mechanisms. 
B. The preliminaries of Information Theory 
In this section, we summarize the information theory concepts 
and theorems that will be used in our later exploration. We 
first review the concepts of entropy, conditional entropy, 
mutual information and entropy rate, which will be used to 
answer the question raised in Section 3. Then we introduce 
Fano's inequality [6], which will be used to answer the 
question of accuracy of DDoS detection. 
1) Entropy, Conditional Entropy, Mutual Information: 
Definition1: The entropy of a discrete random variable X  is 
defined as 



Xx
xXxXXH ]Pr[log]Pr[)(
The entropy of a random variable X  measures the 
uncertainty of X , in the unit of bits. 
Definition 2: The conditional entropy of a random variable 
X conditioned on another random variable Y  is defined as  

 

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The concept of conditional entropy arises when we are 
interested in estimating the value of X, which can not be 
observed directly, using the observation of a related random 
variable Y. The conditional entropy, , measures how 
much uncertainty remains for X given our observation of Y. 
)|( YXH
Definition 3: The mutual information  is defined as );( YXI
)|()( YXHXH  .
Note that before the observation of Y, the uncertainty of X is 
. After the observation, this uncertainty goes down 
to . Therefore, the mutual information measures the 
amount of information we learn about X from observing Y. 
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Definition 4: The entropy rate is the growth rate for a random 
process. For a stationary stochastic process , there are two 
quantities of entropy rate, given as follows 
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2) Fano's inequality: 
In our analysis, we would like to estimate the value of X (the 
attack packages) based on the observation of Y, which 
includes the real attack packages and the normal legitimate 
accessing packages. Recall that the conditional entropy 
 measures how much uncertainty remains for X 
given our observation of Y. Intuitively, the smaller this 
conditional entropy value is, the more accurate the estimation 
that can be made is. This intuition is captured by Fano's 
inequality [6]. 
)|( YXH
Suppose, given an observation of Y, our estimation of X is 
Xˆ . We denote  as the probability that this estimation is 
incorrect, e.g.  . Fano's inequality [6] states the 
following. 
eP
]ˆPr[ XXPe 
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Here,   is  the “overloaded” to stand for the entropy of 
the indicator random variable   
)H( eP
}.ˆ{
1
XX 
3. System Modeling and Analysis 
In a community network, we can manage and configure our 
routers, therefore, the routers can cooperate with each other to 
detect the possible attacks in the early stage. Figure 1 indicates 
a possible attack tree in a network attack. 
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R0
R1
R5
R2
R7
R3
R8
R4
R9
R6
Figure 1. An attack tree in a community network 
In this case, R6, R9, R8 and R5 are the routers at the edge of the 
community network, we call them edge routers, and R0 is the 
router which connected with the victim. In this paper, we use 
this tree topology to explain our detection ideas and methods. 
We suppose the attack packages enter the community network 
via all the edge routers and attack follows will merge at the 
joint routers, e.g. router R3 and R1.
We have a few assumptions in order to make the discussion 
clear and easy to understand.  
 The attackers use the same function to generate 
attack packages at the zombies, and it is stationary 
stochastic process. 
 There is only one server in the community network is 
under attacking or massive accessing at a time. 
 The researched system is linear and stable (this is 
quite reasonable for a short time period). 
Detection algorithms are running on the routers of the 
community network. The edge routers monitor the network 
traffic by router entropy, which is the randomness of the flows 
at the router. In the non-attack case, the router entropy stays in 
a stable range. When there is an attack or a surge accessing, 
the router entropy drops dramatically, because there is one 
flow dominating the routers. In this case, the edge routers treat 
the dominant flow as a DDoS attack suspect, and start to 
calculate the entropy rate of the suspected flow, at the same 
time, edge routers notice their downstream router to calculate 
the entropy rate of the suspected flow. If the entropy rates on 
the routers are the same or very similar, e.g. the difference is 
less than a given value, then the suspected flow will be 
confirmed as a DDoS attack, otherwise, it is a surge of 
legitimate accessing.    
Suppose in an attack scenario, the attacker uses a random 
variable X to control the generation speed of the attack 
packages. For example: using a constant speed to generate the 
packages, namely, , and C is a constant; 
Increasing the number of attack packages according to attack 
time t, , a and b are constants; simulating the 
network accessing as Poison process, namely, 
1}{ CXP
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k  and  is a constant;  and so on. 
We monitor the traffic on each edge router. Similar to paper 
[7], we focus on the flow, which is the packages who share the 
same destination address at a router.  
We use a random variable X to represent the rand process of 
the flows on a router during a time slot. Let 
},...,,{ 21 nxxxX  , and denotes the number of 
packages of different destinations during the time slot, 
respectively. We use the frequency of each flow to represent 
the possibility of that flow. Then we have 
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We use to represent the entropy of a random variable 
X. According to [6], we then obtain: 
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

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Generally speaking, is stable with minor variations. In 
a DDoS attack scenario, the frequency of the flow which 
targets on the victim is extremely greater than the frequencies 
of the other flows, responsively. As a result, decreases
dramatically. However, this happens as well when there is a 
surging of legitimate accessing to one server, rather than a 
DDoS attack. 
)(XH f
)(XH f
Based on router entropy , we can not identify the 
surging of legitimate accessing from DDoS attacks. We, 
therefore, need to find new features to solve this problem. 
)(XH f
 We suppose there are n zombies once the attack software is 
installed , and there is a “standard” zombie, which generation 
speed of the attack packages is exactly X, and X is a random 
variable. Because of the CPU difference and network delay 
difference to the victim, the real attack speed is different from 
each zombie. It is easy to obtain that it is a linear relationship 
of CPU speed ratio and network delay to the “standard” 
zombie as we suppose the network is linear and stable during 
a short time period. Then, we use  to represent the attack 
speed of zombie i
iX
niCbabXaXfX iiiii ...,2,1,,,)(  ……(3)
Theorem 1 For random variable X , and , if )(XfY  )(f  is 
a linear function, then the entropy .)()( YHXH 
Proof: 
Suppose X is a discrete variable, and , then },...,,{ 21 nxxxX 
)}(),...,(),({ 21 nxfxfxfY  . Because of the mapping is a 
one-to-one mapping, therefore, the possibilities of each pair in 
the two domains are the same, respectively. 
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In the case of continuous random variable X, the proof is 
similar. 
Theorem 1 shows clearly that the entropy of attack packages 
generation speed of each zombie in the army is the same, 
although the CPU and the network delay are different among 
the zombies. 
Theorem 2 For random variable X, niXfY ii ,...2,1,)( 
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Hence, we can rewrite it as follow 
)(XfY  ,  is a linear function for random variable X. )(Xf
Based on Theorem 1, the entropy , therefore, 
we obtain: 
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Theorem 2 indicates that on the attack path, the intermediate 
routers aggregate multiple zombies’ attack packages, the 
entropy of the attack packages pumping speed on the 
intermediate routers is the same. 
Theorem 3 For a stationary stochastic process ,
, if  is a linear function, then the entropy rates 
of the two random process are the same, namely, 
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Proof.
As a linear system, we have then we 
have . Furthermore, for the stationary 
stochastic, then we have , and then 
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Apply the chain rule for entropy[6], 
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Theorem 3 showed that the entropy rates of attack rate at 
difference routers in the community network are the same. 
Theorem 4. Given X is the random variable of the attack rate, 
and Y is the random variable of observation of packages to the 
victim (which includes legitimate packages and the attack 
packages). Let  be the possibility of incorrect estimation. 
Then
Pe
12|| )(   ePH

Where || 
 is the number of different samples of the 
observation. 
Proof: 
According to the definition of entropy, 
)1(log)1(log)H( 22 eeeee ppppP 
In the case of attacking, the observation Y definitely includes 
the attack packages X, then . Combine with 
Fano’s inequality, we have  
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It is easy to obtain the following result 
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 Theorem 4 expresses the samples that we need to guarantee 
the accurate of our detection. 
Detection algorithm at routers of the community 
networks
1. for a time window, initiate the parameters 
2. Counting the number of packages to different 
destinations. 
3. calculate the router entropy Hf(X) according 
to formula (1) and (2) 
4. if Hf(X) is less than a given threshold. 
5.    start calculating the entropy rate,  
),...,,(
1
lim)( 21 n
n
XXXH
n
H
	

  for the suspected 
flow, and notice the downstream routers to 
calculate the entropy rate. 
6.  if the entropy rate are the same or the 
difference is less than a given threshold, then 
the attack is confirmed, and discard the 
attack packages. 
Figure 2 DDoS detection algorithm based on information theory 
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4. Algorithms 
Based on the analysis of the previous section, we have the 
corresponding algorithm, which includes two parts: calculate 
the router entropy and the suspected flow entropy rate. The 
algorithm is listed as Figure 2. 
We expect to identify DDoS attacks as early as possible. The 
theorem 4 can be applied to compromise the accuracy of the 
detection and delay of confirming the attacks. 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we focus on detection of DDoS attacks in 
community networks. Our motivation comes from 
discriminate the DDoS attacks from surge legitimate 
accessing, and identify attacks at the early stage, even before 
the attack packages reaching the target server. The entropy of 
flows at a router, router entropy, is calculated, if the router 
entropy is less than a given threshold, then a attack alarm is 
raised; the routers on the path of the suspected flow will 
calculate the entropy rate of the suspected flow. If the entropy 
rates are the same or the difference is less than a given value, 
then we can confirm that it is an attack, otherwise, it is a surge 
of legitimate accessing.  
We have proven that combine the router entropy and the 
entropy rate of flows, we can discriminate DDoS attacks from 
surge legitimate accessing, moreover, we can identify attacks 
at the early stage. Extensive simulations are planed in the very 
near future to test our proposed methods. The comparisons of 
our algorithm and the existing detection algorithms will be 
conducted as well. The future work on the detection theory is 
listed as follows: 
 The compromise of detection accuracy and the 
time of confirming is a critical aspect in the battle 
with DDoS attacks, how to obtain an optimal 
solution for this is quite demanded in practices;  
 Identify DDoS attacks when there are quite 
number of the legitimate accessing to the same 
server. In this case, the entropy rate of the 
suspected flow is not the same. We can treat the 
attack packages as the ‘signal’, which we expect to 
indentify, and the legitimate accessing is treated as 
‘noise’ 
 Attackers may using multiple attack package 
generation functions in one attack, trying to fool 
our detection algorithm, e.g. they may use random 
functions with different seeds, however, we 
believe, there are definitely rules behind the attack 
distributions if they are ‘man-made’ rules. This is 
also a direction that we are going to explore with 
high interest. 
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